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La mayor parte de los estados árabes han buscado tras su independencia una coherencia territorial 
y un gobierno centralizado. La Primavera Árabe ha tenido su efecto sobre esta tendencia. En el 
caso de Egipto, tras la revuelta de 2011 y los sucesos que la siguieron dos actores políticos 
principales como el ejército y los Hermanos Musulmanes han experimentado tanto pérdidas como 
ganancias en el campo político y mostrado cierta continuidad y ruptura en su relación con el 
pueblo y el territorio. Dado que ambos actores aparecieron en el momento (y antes) de la 
independencia y la formación de la República Árabe de Egipto, existe un elemento de política de 
identidad dentro del análisis de los acontecimientos recientes. Ello hace que el análisis de las 
relaciones de ambos actores con el pueblo y el territorio sea un elemento clave para entender los 
hechos recientes, y sus efectos sobre la gobernanza y cohesión territorial de Egipto.   
 
Palabras clave: 




Most Arab states have sought after territorial coherence and centralized governance for the past 
decades following each state’s respective independence.  However, the Arab Spring has impacted 
upon this tendency. In the case of Egypt, after the 2011 uprising and the events that followed two 
principal political actors, such as the army and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) have had both gains 
and losses in the political field and shown certain continuity and rupture with their relationship 
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with the people and the territory. Given that both political actors initially emerged near (and 
before) the time of independence and formation of the Arab Republic of Egypt; there is an element 
of “identity” politics involved in the view of recent events. This renders an analysis of both actors’ 
relationship with the people and territory a key to understanding the recent and current events, 
and their effects on the governance and territorial cohesion of Egypt.  
 
 




The Arab countries that witnessed uprisings starting 2011 (December 2010 for Tunisia) have 
recently celebrated their fifth anniversary. However, the newly instilled regimes of these countries 
are far from being consolidated. Starting December 2015 in Egypt, the National Security (former, 
Central Security Forces, CSF) arrested dozens of social networks’ activists and political group 
members. Raids were carried out on apartments in downtown Cairo and the surroundings of 
Tahrir Square before the 25th of January anniversary. Pictures of the Egyptian army “occupying” 
Tahrir Square to protect it circulated on social networks and independent journalists/ columnists 
described the state as “having a panic attack.”1 Although current Egyptian president, Abdel Fatah 
el-Sissi – previously Field Marshal – portrays a bold, strong grip on the state but the army’s 
legitimacy, as a political actor remains unsettled. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) organization – declared a “terrorist” organization by the Cabinet of Ministers in December 
2013 – is unable to pull its strings together after the 2013 coup d’état and the events that took 
place after that.2 The MB, a socio-political organization, and the Egyptian army, a state security 
apparatus, occupy positions as political actors in Egypt since the first half of the 20th century.  
 
Both political actors rejuvenated their presence in the Egyptian political field since the 2011 
uprising. 2011 presented an opening for both politically disappearing actors to represent or 
reframe the ongoing events with their own symbolic logic and common consciousness. This 
renders an analysis of both actors’ relationship with the people and territory a key to 
understanding the recent – and ongoing – events, and their effects on the governance and 
territorial cohesion of Egypt. This article will concentrate on symbolically relevant points for the 
army and MB as political actors, their relationship to each other, the people and territory. The 
army is part of the state’s security apparatus, and this article is not arguing otherwise; however it 
is treated as a political actor, which mostly concerns the ground army.3 Further, Nazih Ayubi 
referred to the growth of military personnel and expenditure as “growth of body and muscle” of 
Arab states. According to Ayubi, this growth resulted in the increased political role of the 
establishment.4 Hence, in this analysis, Ayubi’s argument places the Egyptian army justly in the 
role of a political actor. Events ranging from “revolutions,” birth or disappearance of a certain 
political discourse, mass mobilizations and repression will be highlighted in the process of carrying 
out this analysis. The series of questions addressed are: what is the connection between each 
political actor – the army and MB –, the territory, and the people (asha’ab)? What is the 
                                                 
1
 Malsin, 2016.   
2
 The MB have had internal problems since the coming of Mohamed Badi’ as Supreme Guide or murshid, according to 
Hisham. Hisham whose name has been changed to safeguard his identity is prominent ex-MB member who was part 
of the Guidance Bureau (maktab al-irshad) until 2012; he is in his late 70s. Also, newspapers keep highlighting the 
ruptures within the organization since 2013. “Egypt Declares Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization,” 2013. 
3
 Egypt’s ground army is the one that carries out most politically affiliated activities and whose participants have most 
presence in the Egyptian political field. This is not only for the Egyptian case; but coup plotters are mostly ground 
armies with few members from the other sections. 
4
 Ayubi, 1995: 256-7.  
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relationship between both actors? How are they centralized or decentralized in local political 
agendas throughout the Egyptian territory? How does this affect the portrayed unity of the 
country? 
 
The theoretical framework of this article is formed of various concepts and ideas. First is the idea 
of gouvernmentalité as of Michel Foucault. Other scholars in examining the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) power dynamics in recent years have used this concept.5 Foucault explains it as a 
form of power of governance in which the population – as a mass – is the subject, and the coercive 
apparatus and political economy are instruments of the state and/or political actor.6 The 
distinction here between the people and the territory, for this article and in Foucault’s writings, is 
pertinent. The treatment of the population as separate of the territory as opposed to as ‘people’ – 
land and population – gives more depth to the analysis in this article of the connection of the army 
and MB to each element specifically and combined.  
 
A second concept is symbolic power and its constituents as of Pierre Bourdieu.7 Symbolic power is 
an invisible power that is derived from outside the political field and yet directly affects it. It 
dictates who is part of the political field, and which institutions and agents are dominating the 
field. In this article, symbolic power is regarded as derived from a rejuvenation of older political 
and socio-historical discourses for the MB and Egyptian army, which were used (or re-used) since 
2011. The attempt of each political actor examined here to gather symbolic capital using the 
events taking place and in turn establishing a connection based on the creation of a common 
consciousness as of Antonio Gramsci’s conception.8  
 
Gramsci’s idea of common consciousness and hegemony are indispensible for this analysis. First, 
common consciousness is essential when analyzing how each actor’s political or public discourse 
formed a sort of common ground for groups of politicized people to mobilize themselves and 
others. Second, hegemony over the state apparatus played a great role in the political and 
symbolic power competition between the army and MB. Both concepts are of relevance in the 
argument regarding both political actors’ centralization or decentralization.     
 
In order to answer the above-mentioned questions using the established theoretical framework, 
the methodology needed to be varied. A discourse analysis of diverse material is used to highlight 
the connection between different instances in the Egyptian political field. This analysis included a 
survey research of popular discourse – includes songs, jokes, and other forms of popular 
expression –, speeches, television emissions, and military declarations. Further, participant 
observation is among the tools used to formulate and emphasize the questions surrounding the 
MB-army relations; and their centralized or decentralized co-existence. Three main interviews are 
integrated to give further evidence.  
 
The outline of this article will be as follows: first, the connection between each political actor with 
Egypt, the people and each other will be analyzed. Second, the centralization and/or 
decentralization of either political actor is explored while considering the varied socio-historical 
                                                 
5
 Scholars like Khaled Fahmy, Lisa Wedeen and Edward Said. Fahmy, 1997; Said,1979; Wedeen, 1999. 
6
 Foucault, Senellart, Ewald, and Fontana, 2007.  
7
 Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991.  
8
 Gramsci, and Forgacs, 1988. 
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contexts, internal and public socio-political discourses of both political formations.9 Last will be a 
further demonstration of the army and MB’s relationship in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising; 
and its effects on their respective internal discourse and structure.     
 
 
The People and the Land between Two Political Actors 
What is the connection between each political actor, the territory, the people (asha’ab), and each 
other?  
 
From the Monarchy to Mubarak 
During the second quarter of the 20th century there was a rise in the anti-occupation and 
nationalist movements in Egypt.10 Political opposition to the monarchy like al-Wafd party was 
already set outside the ‘strife for independence’ map after the 1936 agreement with the British.11 
The army and MB – as two differently constituted types of forces socio-political and military – 
claim right as symbols and actors for Egypt’s liberation from the British occupiers and the coming 
about of the 1952 “revolution” or coup d’état.12 Until today the discourse of the “liberating army 
of the people” on one hand and the “feda’eyoun” (which was a combination of army officers, 
police and MB members) on the other remain a symbolic battle between the MB and the army as 
two political actors.13 The MB’s founder Hassan el-Banna was among the key opponents against 
the British occupation.14 However, the army created originally to obey the regime and the king 
remained to do so as minor faults could lead to a military trial. The Free Officers (al-thobat al-
ahrar, FO) movement within the army was created in the 1940’s; the date is not precise for even 
the members themselves as explained by Khalid Muhi El-Din.15 Thus, both political actors claim 
being agents that brought about the independence of Egypt, and the formation of the first 
Republic.  
 
“Don’t forget that Abdel-Nasser [Nasser] was a member of the ikhwan [MB] in the late 1940’s until 
before the thawra of 1952,” Hisham, a prominent ex-MB member, stated this during an interview 
in 2015.16 Hisham was a MB member since before the 1952 revolution, during his school years.17 
Nasser never declared himself as a MB member and none of the FO did so either.18 Muhi el-Din 
explained how there was a relationship between Nasser and the MB, but still no clear declaration 
of Nasser being a member from the army’s side.19 As of ‘Abd al-Mun’im ‘Abd al-Ra’ûf’s memoirs – 
                                                 
9
 The term agents is used as in Bourdieu’s concept in his explanation of symbolic power and the agents who are 
qualified to speak for the political organization. Ibid.   
10
 Hourani, 1991: 340. 
11
 Al-Bishri, 2002: 99.  
12
 In the media 1952 is referred to as a “revolution,” there is also the “Dictionary of the Egyptian Revolution.” ʻAtịȳat 
Allāh, 1954.   
13 
The police as an apparatus here is also of importance given the recent dynamics in the Egyptian political field and 
starting the 1980’s. However, it is out of the scope of this research to elaborate upon.
  
14
 Al-Bishri, 2002.  
15
 Muhi El-Din is one of the known FO and later member of the Command Council of the Revolution; he is also known 
for his primary affiliation with the communist officers’ group as stated in Aclimandos, 2008. Muḥyī al-Dīn, 1992.  
16
 Hisham said this statement as a summary about the relationship of the MB and the army during the period since the 
1940’s until the 1980’s. The interview covered various aspects about the MB among which is the relationship with 
Sayyied Qutb, the army; and the recent MB defections.   
17
 However recurrent, this declaration becomes more legitimate when someone who witnessed this period himself 
states it. This falls into Bourdieu’s explanation of the symbolic power given by the enunciator himself, as an agent of a 
certain political organization.   
18
 Although Muhi el-Din himself left the brotherhood in 1947 to join the communist officers’ movement Iskra as stated 
in Aclimandos, 2004: 468. 
19
 Hisham explained also the relationship between Nasser and Sayyid Qutb, which was one of the reasons Qutb was 
taken on by the MB.  
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a close friend of Nasser’s and FO – Nasser refused to be subordinated to the MB or its Supreme 
Guide, adding that the army officers will not gather around the principles of the MB based on 
religious righteousness.20 Hisham had explained that during the late forties the relationship 
between the army and the MB became unstable, that was concluded with an end to army-MB 
negotiations regarding the sharing of political space in 1949.21 This puts the topic of this research 
directly on the map of this turbulent relationship between two of the longest living political actors 
in Egypt and their battle of reclaiming the country and its people’s common consciousness.  
 
Further, Nasser was the army’s designated face after he ousted General Mohamed Naguib in 
1954; but that is not only what he represented for the people at the time. The impersonation of 
the army in Nasser and of the FO in Nasser is of relevance at this point since his charisma and 
symbolic power as the leader (aza’im) lives until today in popular discourse.22 For the people who 
lived during Nasser’s time their narration of the period depends on their social and economic 
standard at the time. The lower class admired the fact that they got cheaper access to food, 
education – and more importantly higher education. He made the rise of the middle class 
possible.23 However, people of the higher class saw in Nasser the figure of a lower class political 
hegemon that is seeking revenge from the rich, a Robin Hood that robs the rich to give to the 
poor, using his nationalization policy.  
 
Abdel Halim Hafez, Nasser’s designated singer at the time, sang “in the name of the people” (besm 
esha’ab) on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 1952 “revolution;” the same opening of 
several of Nasser’s speeches.24 The reassertion of the people as connected to the army in slogans, 
songs and general discourse was characteristic of the time as much as it was in 2011 and since 
June 2013. The “army of the people” (geish esha’ab) was a discourse around which the Egyptian 
army was found, it was among the lines used by Ahmad ‘Urabi in 1881 just before Britain stepped 
in to save Egypt’s monarchy.25 It is evident that the army gets its symbolic power from the people 
and the discourse diffused by the former renders this power and collective consciousness possible.  
 
The 1952 coup d’état, labeled “revolution” (thawra), gives a certain power to the actors that 
carried it out.26 Especially, that the 1952 coup is the only event that was explicitly referred to as a 
revolution in the media. The army has ignored over the years, and since the 1950’s repression, the 
role of the MB in the passage from monarchy to republic.27 While on the other hand, the MB in 
their own discourse glorifies their role in the independence of Egypt and leading the opposition 
                                                 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 This is also the year Hassan El-Banna was killed.  
22
 Aclimandos, 2014: 59.  
23
 Interview with Galal Amin, February 2016. Amin is a retired Economics professor known for his Marxist tendencies 
during his early academic career at Ain Shams University, Cairo. He was also a regular columnist at al-shorouk 
newspaper; he also has many critical writings of the social, economic and political state of the Arab world and Egypt 
(refer to Amin in the bibliography).    
24
 This song has a lot of “contentious” terms used in it, which render a whole different analysis about symbolic logic, 
language and political power necessary. However, Nasser used this opening notably in his speech when going back on 
his resignation after the naksah, the 1967 defeat.  
25
 For more details about the ‘Urabi movement’s historiography see: Mayer, 1988. 
26
 Hannah Arendt in On Revolution explains the aura and symbolic power given to an actor that carried out a 
“revolution,” which is mostly the reason why the term is used. (Arendt, 1965). 
27 
Also given the lack of documentation and sources covering the MB since its early stages as stated in Lia, 2015.  
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during the post-Nasser period.28 The MB claim itself as the active, organized and oldest social 
movement in the country; within their internal discourse, they profess a special “soulful” 
connection with the people. The use of religion as a political tool gives the MB a common 
language, or langage, when addressing society as a whole, under the umbrella of a “religious call” 
(al-da’wa). Tariq al-Bishri argues that the MB sought after “dominating Islam” and using it for their 
own political aspirations.29 The use of religion and its convenience to organizations like the MB lies 
in the ‘ready-made’ common consciousness that they provide.   
 
The MB’s contributions during the 1940’s in battling the English occupying forces in Ismailia, Port 
Said and Suez are highlighted in Muhi el-Din’s memoirs, and narrations written by MB members. 
Also, their presence in the Egyptian political field in opposition to al-Wafd party in 1944-46 can 
also be taken into consideration on the road to independence.30 The passage from the Monarchy 
to the Arab Republic of Egypt matters for political actors’ political and symbolic power within their 
respective organizations and also to outsiders.  
 
After the 1952 coup, the MB were approached again by the FO to see if the MB were to take part 
in the government (as ministers or heads of institutions), but these negotiations failed as well.31 
Upon this second failure of the army and MB to agree and Nasser’s coming to power in 1954, a 
different turn in events took place. Nasser decided that the MB should be repressed, especially 
after the Mansheya incident, which Nasser took to be an assassination attempt.32 The repression 
of the MB became hegemonized and legitimized by the Command Council of the Revolution 
(majles qeyadet el-thawra) – which is today’s SCAF.33 The repression did not only touch the 
prominent figures of the MB but also others around them; people they were acquainted with, and 
signs of ‘religiosity’ became a marker of those who should be imprisoned and repressed.34   
 
Political distrust, betrayal and defeat were the prominent sentiments declared from the part of 
the MB towards the army in their internal discourse starting the 1950’s.35 The discourse of 
martyrdom for the good of the people and the country became the core attraction for their 
followers and new members.36 The MB or its ‘derivatives’ grew in popularity and number during 
the presidency of Anouar el-Sadat – another army man and FO. However, since Sadat’s presidency 
political symbols and presence of the army in political positions and in institutional positions 
started to decline. Already during the second half of Nasser’s presidency, army personnel were not 
allowed to wear their uniform or stay in military positions, and occupy a political status 
simultaneously. This was a primary step at ‘de-symbolizing’ the army but what followed was even 
faster and stripped the army of its status as the hegemonic political actor in the Egyptian political 
field for decades.  
 
                                                 
28 
Often referred to as “al-jama’a al-monadilah” (the striving group) or “... al-sameda,” (stern) (Abu Shadi, 1998 and al-
Telmisani, 1982)     
29
 Al-Bishri captured this from the MB’s third conference in 1935’s stated principles, al-Bishri, 2002: 119. However, al-
Bishri later argued that he judged the MB too harshly, see Lia 2015. 
30
 Al-Bishri, 2002: 116. 
31
 Hisham and Muhi el-Din, 1992.  
32
 Nasser was shot at while giving a speech in el-mansheya, Alexandria in 1954. Hisham refuted that the MB had 
nothing to do with this particular incident but he did admit that the MB carried out other assassinations, like that of 
al-Nou’rashi, which were more organized.   
33
 ʻAtịȳat Allāh, 1954. 
34
 Which is a current case with different ranked officers of the army written about in a research by Hossam Bahgat, the 




 Hisham and other anonymous MB members in lower ranks. 
36
 This falls under the idea of “religious nationalism” as Hourani referred to it in his book Arabic Thought in the Liberal 
Age (Hourani, 1967: 341).   
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Starting the 1970’s, one of the most prominent army slogans is “one hand builds and the other 
carries arms.”37 This connects the army, as a political actor, to the Arab Republic of Egypt on a 
different level that is absent from the MB’s discourse.38 The image of the army, which builds, 
manufactures and modernizes Egypt links the army and the vision of a developed Egypt.39 
Different sections attached to the army were formed to lead the new industries and projects in 
the 1950’s until the early 90’s. After all they were “among the relatively more educated, organized 
and technologically oriented sectors of the society.”40 
 
In continuity, during the Mubarak era, both political actors were kept out of politics in one way or 
the other. However, the MB with its social base and mobilization remained in the political field 
from afar. Some of the members ran for parliament membership, as independent candidates; 
demonstrations were organized on several occasions but mostly for a regional cause than to 
oppose the government. The army was absent during this time. The army as manufacturer of 
commodities became the main presence of the army in the people’s lives.41 Abdel Halim Abu 
Ghazala – a previous chief of SCAF, 1981-89, and Minister of Defense – continued the process 
started during Sadat’s era of diminishing the army’s presence in the political field while expanding 
its economic potential and production.42 The army kept an “agreed subservience rather than total 
submission” policy towards the regime.43 Nevertheless, after Mubarak’s fear mounted from the 
increasing popularity of Abu Ghazala, the army retreated further from politics.44   
 
Nevertheless, when it came to the 2011 uprising as an example it was not clear whether either 
political actor has any special connection with the people that they claim to be ‘theirs’ for 
decades. This was seen in the symbols circulating among the protestors and their acceptance or 
acknowledgment of the army or MB’s symbolic power. The detachment from the people grew 
more evident as the events continue to unravel until today. Both – the army and MB – place 
themselves in superiority to the people as portrayed in the coming section of this article. This is 
evident in many recent and historical instances of confrontation between these political actors 
and the people as a politicized mass. The MB claim to be religiously knowledgeable and moderate 
that their members address the others with a sense of superiority in this aspect. Similarly, the 
army has its superiority from having a society of their own, which is formed on the basis of 
selection and filtration.45   
 
Centralization and/or Decentralization: the Army and MB 
How are they centralized or decentralized in local political agendas throughout the country or 
more accurately territory?  
 
                                                 
37
 Chams el-Din, 2013: 5.  
38
 Richards and Waterbury, 1998: 329. 
39
 The same slogan can be seen today on signs in the streets and on bridges in Cairo Egypt, specifically the New Cairo 
district.  
40
 Ayubi,1995: 258.  
41
 The army manufacturers food products and has outlets for distribution.  
42
 Chams el-Din, 2013: 6. 
43
 Droz-Vincent, 2007 as quoted in Chams el-Din, 2013: 5.   
44
 Robert Springborg gives a solid account of the time in his book, Mubarak’s Egypt. He also elaborated on how the 
clientele ties between Abu Ghazala and the US made Mubarak fear him and regard him as a threat (Springborg, 1989: 
95). Also, see Bellin, 2004: 155.  
45
 Abdel-Malek, and Markmann, 1968.   
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The centralization and decentralization debate is crucial to understanding the current situation in 
Egypt, and also to put historically significant socio-political events into perspective. As evident 
from the previous section, the army and MB have had a turbulent relationship, which affected 
their structures and recruitment of candidates.46 The repression of the MB starting the late 50’s 
motivated their dispersal around Egypt and in neighboring Arab countries.47 This section will 
portray how centralized or decentralized both organizations as political actors are on the Egyptian 
territory.  
 
Also, there is the Sinai issue. Ismail Alexandrani explained that the army was not present in Sinai 
since the 1970’s, while the MB was.48 Sinai being a disputed part of the country because of the 
preceding Israeli occupation, making it a matter of pride and glory for the army to be able to re-
enter it again. The army did enter Sinai in 2011 with the claim to “protect the borders” and as part 
of the state of emergency, which is one of the fruits of the army reaped from the 2011 uprising. 
However, the diffusion of the MB in the area is much more profound than the physical and visible 
presence of the army in the recent years.49  
 
The MB is a decentralized institution, which is manifest in various aspects on both structural and 
functional levels. First, the MB’s founding and dispersal throughout Egypt, which goes back to 
when el-Banna traveled throughout Egypt to recruit members starting the 1930’s, supported by 
the monarchy.50 The MB has a history and ties in each governorate in Egypt – they even have a 
logo for each governorate’s cell (sho’ba). The organization’s structure that starts at the Supreme 
Guide (murshid) and goes all the way to family members gives flexibility; but is complimented with 
the internal concept of obedience to the murshid. The organization is divided into governorates; 
each governorate has its head. Within the governorates there are districts and what is referred to 
internally as families (osra or osar). So the hierarchy is socially decentralized in that manner. The 
outlined structure of the MB should not be taken for granted when examining its effects on the 
diffusion of their historical, political and socio-religious discourse or more precisely their 
imaginaire.  
 
However, the decision-making rests in the closed circle of the Guidance Bureau (maktab al-irshad), 
which has members from different governorates (originally) even though most of them reside in 
Cairo. This Bureau consists of about 15 members, which according to Hisham, have been 
constituted mostly of members from the armed wing of the MB, Special Organization (al-tanzim 
al-khass), since Mohamed Badi’s term as Supreme Guide.51 The decentralized organization does 
not imply delegation of decision making when it comes to political mobilization. Al-Bishri explains 
that the MB with its hierarchy is made up of a way that made all decision-making was dependent 
on el-Banna.52 Accordingly, Brynjar Lia states that the MB has an authoritarian style of leadership, 
                                                 
46
 This is especially visible in the higher ranks of the army.   
47
 This was mentioned in the first part of this article. Some members moved to governorates of Upper Egypt to stay 
away from the eyes of the authorities. However, many members also traveled to Jordan and Saudi Arabia to take 
refuge.  
48
 Ismael Alexandrani is a researcher that covers the Sinai and its surrounding areas, concentrating on the presence or 
not of the army in this part of Egypt. His presentation was part of a conference entitled “With or Without the 
Brotherhood,” (Alexandrani, 2015). 
49
 The struggle for gouvernementalité throughout the Egyptian territory is a point that should be further explored in 
detail beyond the scope of this article but is covered in other works. 
50
 Al-Bishri, 2002: 109-110.  
51
 As stated by Hisham. Some sources refer to the same organization as “al-nizam al-khass,” but the term is used as 
according to the candidate’s statement.  
52
 Al-Bishri, 2002: 450.   
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which goes back to el-Banna and the early late 1930’s clashes and internal defections within the 
organization.53   
 
Second is the MB’s repression in the “central” governorates – Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia, Suez, 
Port Saiid – goes back to 1941 and el-Banna’s banishment to Qena.54 This phase did not last long 
due to concessions made on the part of el-Banna towards the regime in 1942 in order to ensure 
the brotherhood’s survival.55 However, after the Mansheya incident in 1954 the MB’s dispersal 
(and in turn decentralization throughout Egypt) played a strong role in their survival and 
continuity.56 The decentralization is still ongoing, today on a global scale even with MB members 
and ex-members living in diaspora around the world.57 On the other hand, the army does not even 
have a recruitment section for each governorate. The conscription is centralized, collecting from 
each governorate while grouping them together in fewer segments. Thus, having little direct 
contact in each specific governorate.  
 
Third, there is the “obedience” (‘ta’a) discourse within the MB, which is the backbone of the 
organization’s hierarchical and decentralized structure. This concept is diffused from the lower, 
student ranks to the highest. The MB leaders claim that obedience of the members is a must in 
order to keep the unity of the “line.” This explains how MB leaders and members are mobilized or 
demobilized according to the Guidance Bureau’s orders and above all the murshid’s.58 While this 
gives rigid boundaries internally between leaders and members, it gives flexibility to the MB as an 
organization and a political actor. For example, taking the previous reference to the MB as 
“latecomers’” to the 2011 uprising. The MB was able to officially declare not participating and not 
give internal orders of doing so. But at the same time they used their autonomous members’ 
participation to prove presence from the beginning and enforce such rhetoric.  
 
The Egyptian army as organized today is the same as Nasser organized it after 1967, with the 
exception of el-Sissi’s recent addition of the Quick Intervention Forces in 2014. The army however 
remains a distant political actor if compared to the MB. The army is socially feared and shut off 
from the public, which surely is explainable since it is still a coercive apparatus and not just a 
political organization like the MB. The army’s hierarchy is not of importance here, while keeping in 
mind that the higher the rank in the ground sectors the more politicized the personnel are.  
 
Conscriptions to the army are not divided into each governorate, so the army does not have a 
physical appearance and representative in each of the 26 governorates. Therefore, the army is not 
visible on most of the territories of Egypt. Conscripts are referred to collective offices that gather 
candidates from several governorates at a time. However, starting 2013 for the army’s vending 
points of their consumer products increased in an attempt to have more physical presence in each 
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governorate and fill the void left by the MB’s preceding NGOs.59 The army’s presence is heavier in 
“key” governorates like Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia, Suez and Port Saiid, among which the first, 
second and third Field armies are divided.60 On the other hand, there are areas in Greater Cairo 
where the army and the police cannot enter un-accompanied by tanks and armored vehicles 
because of the heavy MB presence in those areas.61 Until today these same areas witness protests 
by the MB against the ouster of Morsi. The physical appearance of the army today in some areas 
like Sinai changed the status of the army in the area as a political actor and security apparatus.   
Last but not least the Military Intelligence Unit (al-mokhabarat al-‘askaryah) of the Egyptian army. 
This section is used largely for internal surveillance of army personnel, politically active persons, 
journalists and anyone else that could remotely fall under either category. For example, a human 
rights activist and journalist, Hossam Bahgat was held at the Military Intelligence Unit’s 
headquarter in 2015. Tewfik Aclimandos transcribed the testimony of one of the FO mentioning 
that internal surveillance is a key purpose of the Intelligence to exclude any MB members within 
their ranks.62   
 
The Uprising’s Repercussions: the MB-army relations; and their centralization, and/ or 
decentralization  
 
The uprising in Egypt came following weeks of private television channels and state media 
repeating, “We are not Tunis!”63 This phrase is true on different levels, but not on the level of a 
shared grievance of the people in both Egypt and Tunisia (among other Arab countries). A regional 
grievance sparked the uprisings and encouraged the Egyptian people to mobilize and have hope in 
witnessing change as Fahmy Howeidy – a known columnist – stated.64 The people welcomed the 
army’s presence in the streets of Egypt on the 28th of January 2011; it was a step seen previously 
on television in the case of Tunisia. Thus, for the people it meant that they struck the Mubarak 
regime in some way. However, the army was not the only political actor that officially re-entered 
the Egyptian political field on that day the MB did as well. The civilian patrol groups (legan 
sha’beya) organized in the streets around Egypt after the disappearance of the police and CSF 
were largely managed and handled by the MB throughout Egypt and not just in Greater Cairo.65 
Also, on that same Friday, the MB officially announced its participation in the demonstrations, 
which it had not before that day. The army also re-entered Sinai on the same day for alleged 
protection of a national and symbolic territory.66 In the first instance the links with the centralized 
structure of the army, as a political actor, and the midway decentralization of the MB are evident.  
 
The re-emergence of both political actors in the Egyptian political field resulted in a power 
struggle (symbolic power struggle) and a gap in governance.67 As explained by Bourdieu, such 
struggles are present in times of openings to new political rivalries.68 Internal and/or public 
discourses are of importance in this part of the analysis as they prove the levels of centralization, 
decentralizations and symbolic power of each political actor in the different instances since 2011. 
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Also, the relevance of this discourse to the power and hegemony of the MB and army was clearly 
presented in the media; and thus, the battle between the army and MB to win over the state and 
the people.  
 
An example of the demonstration of the army’s centralization post-2011 can be noted in different 
instances. One instance is the ground army’s appearance in Tahrir Square, other main 
governorates starting the 28th of January 2011.69 Thus showing that the army was seeking central 
strategic control rather than a peaceful support for the demonstrators as allegedly stated at the 
time. As with regards to symbolic power, the army had the impression that since the people 
welcomed the tanks in Tahrir Square that its symbolic power was on the rise or enough to place at 
as the hegemonic political actor. However, this speculation was soon proved wrong when the 
people insisted on keeping asha’ab before al-geish in the famous 1952 slogan “the army and the 
people are one hand” (el-geish w esh’ab eiyd waHda).70 This became clearer as the events 
continued with the Maspero, Mohamed Mahmoud and Port Said massacres.71 
 
Also, the fixation of the army’s discourse on not being subordinate to a civilian is still alive among 
the army members since the time of Nasser and resurfaced during Morsi’s year in power. A first 
sign was Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi’s refusal to salute Morsi as the new Supreme 
Chief of the Armed Forces (al-qa’ed al-‘ala lel qowat al-mosalaHa) when being sworn in as the first 
defense minister and chief of SCAF in 2012.72 Tantawi swore to never salute Morsi, a civilian 
president.73 The refusal to salute is a symbol and a sign; it shows if the new political agent, Morsi, 
is considered part of this military society or even on the fringe of their habitus, using Bourdieu’s 
terms. It is a sign given to the people and the army corpus equally that the army does not accept a 
civilian president.74 This salute or non-salute drains some of the MB’s symbolic power to their 
counterpart, the army, when being presented on the different media.  
 
Further, the timing of the murder of 16 army soldiers in Sinai during Morsi’s rule increased the 
army’s symbolic power, as the patriotic army; while asserting its presence in the territory even 
more.75 Morsi’s repetition in several speeches of being the Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces 
showed how the MB were threatened by being on bad terms with the army politically and 
disrespected in their ‘society.’ Also, it showed how the socio-historical competition between both 
political actors started in the 1940s was not over. This situation showed the MB’s vulnerability and 
lack of confidence in a ‘transparent’ political status, in which they had the legitimacy of the ballot 
boxes; but not the hegemony over the centralized state and its apparatuses.76      
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On the other side of the political battle, the MB’s symbolic capital was as insufficient in 2011 as 
the army’s. The reasons were more apparent than the people’s rejection of the army. The MB was 
(and is) regarded, as remnants of the Mubarak era, throughout Mubarak’s time there were no 
attempts of grass-root change or rebellion. The quasi-decentralized structure of the MB is more 
vivid than the centralization of the army in several post-2011 events. First, as much as the phrase 
“latecomers” to the 25th of January uprising upsets some academics when describing the MB’s 
attitude towards the 2011 uprising. They are regarded as such until today by interviewees because 
of the Bureau’s orders to not take part on the 25th of January 2011’s demonstrations.77 Yet, their 
decentralization and partial autonomy of their members provided the flexibility to note presence. 
Second, as mentioned previously, their official presence with the murshid’s orders on the 28th of 
January, which is evidence for the ‘quasi-decentralization’ and abuse of the concept of 
obedience.78 Third, in Mohamed Mahmoud’s demonstrations against the SCAF, the Bureau again 
retreated from the Square, while autonomous members proved presence. In continuity, the 
defections in the lines of the MB that started on the eve of the 2011 uprising and apparent 
rupture between the centralized decision making process of the Bureau and murshid, on one 
hand; and the rest of the members on the other, rings the bells with similar historical ruptures in 
the MB. Reminiscence far back as the 1930’s come about with defections in the lines of the MB 
attributed to their decentralized structure; but centralized decision making, or consultation 
(shura) of the few.  
 
Other symbols of the MB’s quasi-decentralized existence are numerous during the period from 
2011-2014; however, the last most relevant example is that of the Rab’a Square sit-in in 2013. 
Accounts by several members – and even in later corpse identifications in late 2013 – confirmed 
that there were members from various governorates and not just Greater Cairo. This example 
demonstrates two different points; one, the centralization effects of the state structure; and two 
is the centralization of the MB’s actions and mobilization accordingly.          
 
In Rab’a Square, the sit-in had MB members, their families and supporters; even some ex-
members went to protest there despite their differences with the organization.79 The spirit there 
had nothing beyond the regular MB vibe that could be caught in any of their organized public 
gatherings. After July 2013, different state and private television channels put a logo “against 
terrorism” at the corner of their screens.80 Thus, renewing an old discourse from the 1950’s and 
60’s of the Egyptian army fighting the “terror” of the Islamists or the MB in particular. During the 
late 50’s and 60’s in Egypt, state newspapers akhbar al-youm and al-ahram wrote about 
“terrorists” (al-irhabeyoun) referring to hundreds of MB members and their trial at the time.81 In 
2013, for the first time since Nasser, the MB’s repression came from the army itself. After the 
2013 coup terms like “vengeance” (qassas) circulated among some MB members, mostly youth 
(ages 15 until 40), signaling further fractures within the MB’s social network, adding to the 
previous point on the effects of their social decentralization. As the association of the MB with the 
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term “terror” in the media continued, in August 2013 the Rab’a Square dispersal took place.82 
Some MB members in 2014 and 2015 declared that the sit-in was made to mainly stay on the table 
of negotiations with the army.83 The ‘othering’ of one political actor or the other at the different 
instances provide for the explanation of how symbolic power shifted during the three years 
following the initial uprising.   
 
 
Centralization and the People: the effects on the portrayed unity of the country 
Since 2011, attempts of shedding light on the different governorates of Egypt by different 
researchers have been made. However, in May 2011 in a conference at Cairo University in 
collaboration with the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, several presentations made 
clear the following effects of political actors’ centralization (and political events). First is the 
concentration of the media on certain governorates and not covering the rest, which affects the 
discourses of the key political actors today; their influence; and eventually structure as in the case 
of the MB. The fact that there are protests until today that take place in some governorates, which 
are only found out about through some elements of social media through personal accounts. 
Second is that some people came from other governorates to protest in what the researchers in 
that seminar highlighted as masr, which is Egypt in Arabic, and by which they are referring to 
Cairo’s Tahrir Square. The same goes for the demonstrations that followed in 2012 until 2014. 
Thus, if it is not happening in masr it is not taking place. This is relevant when ignoring the protests 
that take place today in the governorates away from the coercive apparatuses’ reach (military 
included).84 
 
Last, but not least, is the unimportance given to the people in general as political actors. A key 
example is the strikes by the textile and weaving workers in Helwan (considered part of Greater 
Cairo, which includes Giza).85 The workers’ strikes since 2005 and in 2008 were among the most 
felt mobilizations in Egypt at the time.86 Nadine Abdalla gives exact numbers of labor protests 
1,200 in 2011 and 3,400 in 2012.87 The number, and socio-economic composition of the labor 
movement since the early 2000s renders their existence in the Egyptian political field and as a 
social force necessary. However, voices of organizations like the Egyptian Federation of 
Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) remain unheard despite their continuous struggle to gain 
political significance and empowerment since 2011 until today.88 In this lays again the media’s 
concentration on masr, and what their choice of what to cover (or ignore) as part of the 
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Egypt like most Arab states, as ex-colonies, sought after territorial coherence and centralized 
governance for decades following each state’s respective “independence.” The MB and the army 
are ‘contingent’ political actors that emerged (or remerged) during the 2011 uprising in Egypt. This 
article analyzed how both actors represent “la greffe de l’État” as of Jean-Francois Bayart’s 
terms.89 Bayart explained that there are social groups that “instrumentalize” the newly formed 
state apparatus during the passage from colonialism to globalization for their own power gains 
and economic interests.90 The MB and the army are both symbolically and bureaucratically 
attached to the making of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Partisans of both actors repeat symbols, 
slogans and discourses manifesting a profound political and symbolic power rivalry, which was 
proved through the inclusion of their historical relationship in the analysis.  
 
Also it can be concluded that the gap in gouvernmentalité of the army and MB could be attributed 
to several bureaucratic and institutional reasons. First is the centralization of the state (as an 
apparatus, bureaucracy and even opposition); second, the institutionalization of this same 
centralization in certain state institutions including the coercive or security apparatuses (among 
which is the military). Third, the reliance of the state for years on Non-governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), many of which are religiously or MB affiliated, to fill in the gaps in state services 
(education, health, welfare, etc.).   
 
While the Egyptian people attempted to seek change and express themselves since 2011, the 
presence of the army and MB in the political field resulted in the surfacing of an old vicious socio-
political and symbolic rivalry. The centralized pillars of the MB’s discourse, their use of religion 
with “fanatisme borné” (tazammut) – borrowing Aclimandos’ terms – and quasi-decentralization 
are manifest in the appointment el-Sissi as Defense Minister and Chief of SCAF based on his 
religious appeal.91  
 
Further, the division of both actors’ political, economic and social influence is evident from the 
symbols present in each governorate and how much the people are connected (or not) to these 
symbols. The army is the hegemonic political power today but still some tasks previously fulfilled 
by the MB are left unattended to.92 The army is unable to provide the social and health care 
services the MB carried out before they were declared a terrorist organization. The MB’s 
repression following the events of 2013 and their internal problems are making it more difficult 
for them as an organization to recompose itself today; in addition to the absence of a clear and 
uniting Supreme Guide. However the relationship between both actors might seem non-
resolvable, their continuity is highly co-dependent on each other’s presence even if in the shadows 
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